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What can the social emotions of dogs teach us about human emotions?
Commentary on Cook et al. on Dog Jealousy

Dean Mobbs
California Institute of Technology
Abstract: It has long been believed that social emotions such as guilt and jealousy are only
expressed in humans. In the case of jealousy, its adaptive value has been linked to the prevention
of sexual infidelity or fairness. So why would dogs feel jealousy? I suggest that understanding how
social emotions have been bred into dogs can help us understand our own emotions, including
their functionality — and potentially their mechanisms.
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Canines have been domesticated by humans for over 10,000 years (Larson et al., 2012). In modern
western society, they are the oldest and among the most popular of domesticated species (i.e.,
pets). Given the close, sometimes symbiotic, relationship between humans and dogs (canis
familiaris), it is inevitable that humans are intrigued enough to study the neural circuits in this
species. What makes dogs interesting is their amenability to human artificial selection (i.e.,
domestication), which has led to entirely new branches of taxa. These branches were bred for a
variety of usual human purposes, including hunting, protection, and in most modern cases,
companionship. The utility of dogs differs across strains from the great intelligence of the Border
Collie to those that are bred for health or even aesthetic purposes (i.e., the Chihuahua). Across
most species of domesticated dog, however, it is their remarkable capacity to exhibit human-like
social emotions that has led many to believe that they may have evolved a set of neural circuits
resembling the social brain circuits observed in humans.
Longitudinal work in Russia has shown that foxes can be artificially molded to be cute (i.e.,
pedomorphosis) and obedient or nasty-looking and aggressive (Trut, 1999). The engineering of
these foxes occurred over very short periods of time (i.e., 40 years), and it is clear that the
emotional style of the animal can also be molded in a way that is adaptive to humans. Recent
research has also shown that domesticated canines have developed facial muscles so that they
can express emotion, unlike their wolf ancestors (Waller et al., 2013). The domesticated dog is
also very loyal and obedient and listens upon instruction. This is matched only by higher primates.
But whereas primates evolved similar traits via natural selection, the canine species has been
socially engineered by humans. It is this engineering of social emotions that gives us insight into
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the functions of our own social emotions. Panksepp and Biven (2012) go one step further by
stating that “we do not believe that one can understand human emotional feeling without
understanding those of fellow animals” (p. 71).
The current theoretical landscape of affective neuroscience. The word “emotion” is an umbrella
term for a set of basic and higher-order social emotions. The basic emotions, which include fear,
anger, disgust, sadness, surprise and joy, are believed to occur in many higher mammals (e.g.,
primates, canines, elephants, and dolphins). On the other hand, emotions such as guilt, awe and
jealousy are believed to be a combination of these basic emotions and part of a rich palette of
social emotions that are thought to occur only in humans. Ask any dog caregiver, however, and
they will ardently tell you that their dog exhibits these same social emotions. How do these
anecdotal observations fit with contemporary theories of emotion? In one camp, mainly captured
by Barrett’s (2017) Conceptual Act Theory, emotions are not universal; they emerge from the
combination of external and internal sensations evolved through various distributed brain circuits
that create emotional experiences and perceptions. In contrast, Ekman and Panksepp (2011)
argue that a set of basic universal and domain-specific emotions is hard-wired in the brain (e.g.,
fear and rage circuits). Research by Cook and colleagues (2018) seems to support the latter in
showing that in dogs, complex social emotions such as jealousy may involve the same neural
structures as in humans (Takahashi et al., 2006), which suggests that they may be not only
universal, but may also extend across species. The question is still open, however, as to whether
dogs experience social emotions in the same way we do. Do they, like humans, have tertiary
emotional processes that involve the cortical circuits of metacognition, rumination and
consciousness? The answer could support other theories, including Conceptual Act Theory.
Feelings vs. automata. Adolphs’s (2017) review asked whether dogs have conscious emotions.
The answer is controversial, as advocates of the “dogs have feelings” camp (e.g., Safina 2016)
have mostly leaned on behavioral observations that are biased by anthropomorphism and
restricted by the inability to gain subjective reports. This is one of the central arguments of
LeDoux’s (2012) Survival Circuits Theory, in which only overt behaviors can be used to examine
survival circuits (including social emotions) in animals. Most controversial is the notion that fear
is a conscious experience and can only be studied in humans. What is interesting is that in several
species, imaging tools such as fMRI have allowed us to see inside the animal brain during the
evocation of a variety of emotions (e.g., in primates: Oler et al., 2010). Conditions that evoke a
sense of danger activate threat circuits (see Mobbs, in press), such as the amygdala; reward states
induce dopaminergic activity in the striatum in a growing list of species. The work of Cook and
colleagues (2018) extends this research to canines, yet we are still left with the question of
whether dogs feel emotions as we do or they are just emotional automata. The evidence is not
there yet, but it certainly reveals some conserved capacity in dogs to express emotions, involving
circuits similar to those in the human brain. An interesting question is whether we should see
automatisms and conscious feelings as a continuous dimension rather than as two discrete
categories.
What do dogs tell us about our emotions? Dogs mirror our social emotions because they have
been engineered to do so. If we agree with this statement, then we can ask a series of questions:
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(i)

(ii)

(iii)

Are expressions of emotion used as tools of communication or manipulation? Any
parent will tell you that a child will learn to use expressions of emotion instrumentally
to acquire a goal (e.g., ice cream). The emerging consensus is that facial expressions of
emotional states are used as core social communication tools (Jack and Schyns, 2015).
As mentioned, domesticated dogs have a unique set of facial muscles that mirror those
of humans — muscles not observed in wolves — leading to the conclusion that these
muscles have been artificially selected to mimic human facial expression. This theory,
however, is difficult to prove and would require comparisons between different species
of dog.
How does scientific work on dogs influence theories of emotions in humans? LeDoux’s
Survival-Circuits Theory still stands because we cannot ask dogs how they feel. Yet the
enriched facial expressions and overlapping emotional circuits in dogs support the idea
that they may feel emotions as we do. Dogs certainly exhibit sustained emotions (e.g.,
shivering excitement), yet the question is still open whether they have the conscious
ability to process feelings as we do (I doubt this). Panksepp’s notion of hard-wired
circuits, which are observed in rodents and potentially now dogs, seems plausible, but
whether jealousy is just an extension of the rage circuit or rather of tertiary cognitive
circuits is not known. In her book, Barrett (2017) asks: “Is a growling dog angry”?
Conceptual Act Theory suggests that the social emotions of dogs are the expression of
their own emotional concepts but that dogs probably don’t have a concept of jealousy
(although she seems open to this, given the unique domestication of dogs).
Are our own emotions socially engineered? I think they are engineered, at least
partially. Developmental theories suggest that social learning occurs early in life and
that a parent’s expression of emotion will result in the child’s learning that same
emotional expression vicariously (Eisenberg, Cumberland and Spinrad, 1998). The
expression of emotions may differ across cultures (Tsai, Knutson and Fung, 2006),
supporting the idea that culture engineers our emotions. Much like our parents, we
have created an environment where we engineer the emotions of other species.

In conclusion, the behavioral and neuroscientific work on dogs raises questions about why we
have social emotions: what is their functionality? The work on dogs teaches us that emotions have
instrumental value in social communication, with jealousy providing the observer with a signal of
discontent or aggression. This research also reveals that emotions can be socially engineered and
that humans and dogs have a common set of social neural circuits. Although subjective verbal
reports cannot be obtained from dogs, the work of Cook and colleagues (2018) suggests that the
behavioral and neural manifestations of canine jealousy overlap with those of humans, taking us
closer to understanding whether dogs have human-like feelings.
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